May 13, 2026  MRonline:

 

An  op-ed, by arch-neoconservative Robert Kagan in the pro-war Atlantic magazine,  confirms that take. Kagan, who had pushed the Bush/Cheney administration towards its war on Iraq is conceding that the U.S. has lost its war on Iran:

Checkmate in Iran – Washington can’t reverse or control the consequences of losing this war.(archived) – Atlantic

It’s hard to think of a time when the United States suffered a total defeat in a conflict, a setback so decisive that the strategic loss could be neither repaired nor ignored.
…
Defeat in the present confrontation with Iran will be of an entirely different character. It can neither be repaired nor ignored. There will be no return to the status quo ante, no ultimate American triumph that will undo or overcome the harm done. The Strait of Hormuz will not be “open,” as it once was. With control of the strait, Iran emerges as the key player in the region and one of the key players in the world. The roles of China and Russia, as Iran’s allies, are strengthened; the role of the United States, substantially diminished. Far from demonstrating American prowess, as supporters of the war have repeatedly claimed, the conflict has revealed an America that is unreliable and incapable of finishing what it started. That is going to set off a chain reaction around the world as friends and foes adjust to America’s failure.

Kagan acknowledges that the U.S. has no way out of its dilemma:

Even if Trump were to carry out his threat to destroy Iran’s “civilization” through more bombing, Iran would still be able to launch many missiles and drones before its regime went down—assuming it did go down. Just a few successful strikes could cripple the region’s oil and gas infrastructure for years if not decades, throwing the world, and the United States, into a prolonged economic crisis. Even if Trump wanted to bomb Iran as part of an exit strategy—looking tough as a way of masking his retreat—he can’t do that without risking this catastrophe.

If this isn’t checkmate, it’s close.

Kagan is considering the alternative, a total war on Iran, but rejects it as a worse path which is likely to lead to even bigger failure:

Unless the U.S. is prepared to engage in a full-scale ground and naval war to remove the current Iranian regime, and then to occupy Iran until a new government can take hold; unless it is prepared to risk the loss of warships convoying tankers through a contested strait; unless it is prepared to accept the devastating long-term damage to the region’s productive capacities likely to result from Iranian retaliation—walking away now could seem like the least bad option. As a political matter, Trump may well feel he has a better chance of riding out defeat than of surviving a much larger, longer, and more expensive war that could still end in failure.

Defeat for the United States, therefore, is not only possible but likely. Here is what defeat looks like.
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The new status quo in the strait will also occasion a substantial shift in relative power and influence both regionally and globally. In the region, the United States will have proved itself a paper tiger, forcing the Gulf and other Arab states to accommodate Iran. As the Iran scholars Reuel Gerecht and Ray Takeyh wrote recently, “The Gulf Arab economies were built under the umbrella of American hegemony. Take that away—and the freedom of navigation that goes with it—and the Gulf states will ineluctably go begging to Tehran.”

They will not be the only ones. All nations that depend on energy from the Gulf will have to work out their own arrangements with Iran. What choice will they have?

Kagan believes that the loss of the war on Iran will have much wider implications for the U.S. position around the globe:

The global adjustment to a post-American world is accelerating. America’s once-dominant position in the Gulf is just the first of many casualties.

Later this week U.S. President Donald Trump is supposed to visit China. An administration preview of the visit, published in the Financial Times (archived), pretends that the U.S. can still use its war to apply pressure around the globe:

“I would expect the president to apply pressure,” a US official told reporters in a briefing. He said Trump would resume previous discussions with Xi about China’s support for Iran and Russia, including providing them with dual-use components and potential arms exports.“I expect that conversation to continue. I think you’ve seen some actions, meaning sanctions, c oming out from the US side just in the last few days that I’m sure will be part of that conversation,” the official added.

The State Department on Friday imposed sanctions on three Chinese satellite companies for providing imagery and other services to Iran that helped it conduct military strikes against US forces in the Middle East. The Treasury also sanctioned Yushita Shanghai International Trade for helping Iran import man-portable air-defensive systems [Manpads] from China.

Trump still hasn’t recognized that, after he has lost the war, the sanctions game is also over. It is certainly not in Chinese, or anyone other’s interest to help the U.S. to regain the hegemonic position it has now lost in the Gulf.

 

-This article originally appeared at Moon of Alabama, May 11, 2026

 

PHOTO: “How the Iran War Exposed a Key U.S. Vulnerability No One Is Talking About” (video by William Spaniel – a professor who studies war and game theory.)